Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

HE Mr Richard Sadleir, Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA

Agenda Item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

8 June 2021

Australia is a strong and longstanding supporter of the critical international work undertaken by the Director General and his staff at the IAEA. We continue to have full confidence in the Agency’s rigorous, independent and professional approach to verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In this vein, we welcome and fully support the Director General’s tireless efforts to preserve and maintain the agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities and welcome his determination to ensure the IAEA is able to retrieve critical safeguards data and preserve continuity of knowledge in Iran.

Australia supports the nuclear non-proliferation objectives of the JCPOA. We welcome the talks on the future of the JCPOA that continue to take place in Vienna. We, like many others, hope for an appropriate and constructive outcome to this dialogue.

Iran’s 23 February 2021 decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol, is deeply regrettable and deeply concerning.

In the absence of an AP, the IAEA is denied the additional access, verification tools and information required to assure the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran.

Australia also remains very concerned by Iran’s growing stockpile of enriched uranium. The total stockpile now exceeds three tonnes, and includes an estimated 62.8kg of uranium enriched to 20 per cent, and an estimated 2.4kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235.

The stockpile is just one element of Iran’s wide range of ongoing research, development and production activities which exceed JCPOA limits – the detail of which is well-catalogued in the Director General’s report, GOV/2021/28.

Taken as a whole, these activities have serious and irreversible non-proliferation implications. They work against the international community’s shared interest in security, stability and non-proliferation.

We reiterate our urgent call on Iran to reverse all of its steps away from the JCPOA and to recommit itself to the terms of the agreement.

We further urge Iran to return promptly to full implementation of the Additional Protocol and other JCPOA transparency commitments.

We request that the Director General continues to report further developments on these matters and ask that GOV/2021/28 be made public.