IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda Item 6: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
12 September 2023
Statement by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Chair
Australia continues to support the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We extend our continued appreciation to the Agency for its professionalism, impartiality and dedication in respect to its crucial work in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Chair
We note with concern that there has been no further progress by Iran in implementing the commitments to which it agreed in the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023.
The lack of progress, coupled with Iran’s de-designation of experienced Agency inspectors and refusal of visas to Agency officials runs counter to the cooperative relationship that should prevail between the Agency and Iran, and is deeply troubling.
We continue to note with alarm the growth of Iran’s stockpile of high enriched uranium (HEU) at an order of magnitude far greater than that allowed under the JCPOA.
Of deep concern is Iran’s stockpile of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 60 per cent U-235. Iran has no credible civilian reason to produce uranium enriched to this level. This sends a concerning signal regarding possible intent and comes after a pattern of sustained and concerning escalations in Iran’s nuclear programme.
Chair
We note with continued concern Director-General Grossi’s advice that the Agency has been unable to perform verification and monitoring activities under the JCPOA for over two and a half years.
We call on Iran to reverse its refusal to permit the Agency to install additional monitoring cameras and to enable the Agency to retrieve data from installed cameras, including at Esfahan.
Iran’s decision in 2021 to cease implementation of its monitoring and verification commitments under the JCPOA has broken continuity of knowledge over Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuge components, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate, undermining the IAEA’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s program.
Even in the event Iran returns to implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA, the Agency would not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge in relation to these items.
Chair
Australia calls on Iran to recommit to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. This would of course involve Iran reversing all steps away from the JCPOA.
Australia further calls on Iran to fully implement the activities set out in the 4 March Joint Statement and cooperate immediately with the Agency to re-establish a satisfactory understanding of Iran’s inventory of centrifuge components.
Australia supports the JCPOA’s non-proliferation aim of ensuring Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful.
Australia fully supports the Director General’s efforts to preserve the Agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities. We request that the Director General continue to report further developments on these matters to the Board and ask that GOV/2023/39 be made public.