70th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference
AUKUS Trilateral Right of Reply
Delivered by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Head of Delegation, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
18 September 2026
Thank you, President.
I have the honour of speaking in right of reply on behalf of AUKUS partners: Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to respond to the serious mischaracterisations we have heard concerning Australia’s program to transition from its current fleet of six diesel fuelled submarines to eight conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
President,
I refer colleagues to the General Conference document GC(70)/21 circulated on 14 September which reiterated our concerns regarding the addition of this politicised agenda item by China. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States do not support the inclusion of this politically motivated and unnecessary agenda item, which is a misuse of this Conference’s valuable time, and adds unnecessary administrative costs.
President,
We regret that this agenda item, both here and at the Board, continues to be used to cast doubt on the Agency’s clear authority to negotiate directly and in-confidence with Member States on safeguards implementation. The Director General has made clear that the Agency’s engagement with Australia in this regard is entirely within its mandate, under its Statute and safeguards agreements approved by the Board of Governors.
This item disrespects the Director General’s exercise of his mandate in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program. It is important that Member States continue to reject all attempts to undermine and politicise the IAEA’s independent, technical mandate – on which we all rely.
As the Director General has repeatedly indicated, naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific provision enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion, within the safeguards framework.
President,
Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners’ respective international obligations, including under the NPT, Australia’s CSA and Additional Protocol, and Australia’s obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga).
Australia’s submarines will be conventionally armed. Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom and the United States have not, and will not, provide any assistance, encouragement or inducement for Australia do so. Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, and accompanying infrastructure in Australia, will be fully sovereign. Any suggestion otherwise is false.
The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is not for nuclear weapons and is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
President,
AUKUS partners have made clear our commitment to ensuring that the non-proliferation approach for Australia’s program, including an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s CSA, sets the highest non-proliferation standard. As we have said previously, we are not seeking to create or impose a model arrangement on others. Given state-specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programs, a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not be effective. Australia's arrangement, once finalised, will enable the IAEA to fulfill its technical objectives at all stages of the submarines’ lifecycle: verifying there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.
President,
The Director General has made it clear that he will continue to keep Member States informed on developments in his engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs. As the Director General’s regular reporting to the Board on Australia’s program confirms, Australia continues to provide the Agency with all information required under its safeguards agreements, and the Agency continues to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.
The Director General has also made clear that, in due course, Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will come to the Board for appropriate action; as we have previously stated, AUKUS partners fully support this approach. At that time, we expect the arrangement to be considered in light of the Director General’s technical assessment.
AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and will continue to engage openly with genuine questions on our non-proliferation approach. As in previous years, Australia delivered an update to this year’s General Conference, through our national statement during the General Debate. AUKUS partners have also provided updates at every regular meeting of the Board of Governors since the AUKUS partnership was first announced in 2021, as we remain committed to keeping IAEA members informed about our non-proliferation approach and relevant programmatic developments. We also direct members to our NPT Review Conference Working Paper published earlier this year, which can be found online.
President,
Once again, I must express our regret at having to intervene under this unnecessary and politicised agenda item. We continue to welcome discussion of naval nuclear propulsion programs in the Board, under apolitical items proposed by the Director General, when he judges appropriate. Such discussions, guided by the Director General’s technical assessments, serve to uphold the Agency’s independent, impartial and technical role in safeguards implementation – something we should all strive to protect.
Thank you, President.