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Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

Statement by Mr Emil Stojanovski, Alternate Representative of Australia to the IAEA

Agenda Item 3: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

18 November 2020

 

 

Australia remains deeply concerned that the Islamic Republic of Iran refuses to abide by the operational limits set in the JCPOA.

As we have stated repeatedly, Australia finds Iran’s wind-back on the basis of ‘less-for-less’ unacceptable and we join others in calling on Iran to immediately cease all activities in excess of JCPOA limits.

 

As we have previously noted, Australia is very concerned by Iran’s advanced centrifuge research and development activities. These activities are now far in excess of JCPOA limits, and bring with them serious non-proliferation implications.

Iran’s steps towards transferring three ‘production cascades’, and ultimately all centrifuge research and development activity, from the PFEP into the FEP at Natanz are yet further moves in the wrong direction.

We are extremely concerned that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile continues to accumulate, and is now almost 2.5 tonnes.

We are also concerned that the Agency has received responses which are neither satisfactory nor technically credible, to its questions regarding uranium particles of anthropogenic origin found at a location in Iran not declared to the Agency.

These concerns are heightened by the Agency’s detection of isotopically altered particles of low enriched uranium with a detectable level of U-236 and of slightly depleted uranium.

We urge Iran to provide a full and prompt explanation regarding the presence of these particles as requested by the Agency. Strict adherence to IAEA safeguards obligations is a foundational element of nuclear non-proliferation architecture.

The IAEA must be able to conduct its important work, including the analysis of all safeguards relevant material and information.

 

Australia remains of the view that the JCPOA can continue to serve the international community’s nuclear non-proliferation interests.

But for this objective to be realised, Iran must change its course, recommit itself to the terms of the deal and engage in constructive diplomatic dialogue.

Australia again strongly urges Iran to return immediately to full compliance with all of its obligations under the JCPOA.

 

Australia recognises the substantial efforts of France, Germany and the UK to preserve the JCPOA. We note that discussions under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism are ongoing.

We encourage Iran to engage constructively and refrain from further actions that might jeopardise these efforts.

We again underline that the provisional application by Iran of its Additional Protocol, in accordance with the terms of the deal, remains fundamental to Australia’s ongoing support for the JCPOA.

 

I would like to reiterate our thanks to IAEA staff who continue to tirelessly undertake verification and monitoring activities in Iran. We greatly value and strongly support your work, particularly in overcoming the challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure uninterrupted implementation of safeguards.

 

Consistent with past practice we call for these two latest reports to be made public.