Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

Statement by HE Mr Richard Sadleir, Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA

Agenda Item 6: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

3 March 2021



Australia expresses our strong and longstanding support for the work of the Director General and the staff of the IAEA.

Australia emphasises our full confidence in the Agency’s rigorous, independent and professional approach to verification and monitoring in Iran.

To that end, we welcome and fully support the continued, determined efforts of the Director General as he seeks to preserve and maintain the agency’s JCPOA monitoring activities.


Australia supports the nuclear non-proliferation objectives of the JCPOA. It is a source of deep concern that Iran’s nuclear program now far exceeds its JCPOA limits and commitments.

We share the regret and concern expressed by others over Iran’s growing enriched uranium stockpile, its decision to enrich up to 20 per cent U-235, its continually expanding centrifuge research and development, and its decision to begin production of uranium metal.

Taken as a whole, these steps have serious, irreversible non-proliferation implications – and no credible civilian justification. They work against our shared interests of security, stability and non-proliferation.


Australia is seriously concerned by Iran’s decision to stop implementing provisions of the Additional Protocol, modified Code 3.1, and transparency measures envisaged in the JCPOA.

The AP is a key part of the international safeguards system. It provides the IAEA with additional access, verification tools and information to assure the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran.

In turn, the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation pursuant to Iran’s safeguards agreement which cannot be modified unilaterally.

We urge Iran to immediately restore cooperation with the IAEA and return to full implementation of the Additional Protocol and other JCPOA transparency commitments.


There remains a window of opportunity for constructive diplomatic dialogue and to restore confidence. We reiterate our urgent call on Iran to reverse its recent decisions, return to JCPOA limits and to recommit itself to the terms of the agreement.


We request that the Director General continues to report further developments on these matters and ask that GOV/2021/10 be made public.