IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 13: Any Other Business
12 September 2024
Trilateral statement delivered by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States
Thank you, Chair.
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to update the Board on Australia’s program to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
Chair,
Bilateral technical consultations between Australia and the IAEA, covering a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program are continuing, including regarding the development of an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material. At all stages of Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, the Agency will continue to fulfil its technical safeguards objectives for Australia: verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. The Director General has indicated that Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, once developed, will be referred to the Board for appropriate action; we fully support this approach.
Chair,
We remain committed to keeping the Board updated on relevant developments concerning our three countries’ cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion.
On 5 August 2024, our governments signed the trilateral, treaty-level AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which has subsequently been submitted for consideration to our respective legislatures. On entry into force, this Agreement will enable the continued sharing of naval nuclear propulsion information between the parties, and will also enable the transfer of nuclear material and equipment from the United States and the United Kingdom to Australia to support Australia’s conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines acquisition.
The Agreement reaffirms AUKUS partners’ commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard and confirms the key principles underlying our strong non-proliferation approach.
- It reaffirms and is consistent with the AUKUS partners’ respective international legal obligations, including Australia’s non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, the Treaty of Rarotonga, and its safeguards agreements with the Agency.
- Importantly, under the Agreement, the US and UK cannot transfer any nuclear material to Australia for use in conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines prior to Australia having an Article 14 arrangement in place with the IAEA.
- The Agreement makes clear that the UK or US will only provide Australia with nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in complete, welded power units, that will not require refuelling during the submarines’ lifetime.
- Under the Agreement, Australia is prohibited from enriching uranium, producing nuclear fuel, or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for naval nuclear propulsion. Australia will not receive any information that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, or a facility for production of heavy water.
- The Agreement obliges Australia to collaborate with the other parties on measures to be developed with the IAEA, to support the Agency’s ability to meet its technical safeguards objectives with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement. The Agreement also obliges parties to ensure that Australia can provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to fulfil Australia’s safeguards obligations to the IAEA.
We welcome the Director General’s statement of 15 August noting these key features of the Agreement and confirming that Australia has provided the Agency with updated declarations under its Additional Protocol.
Chair,
AUKUS partners continue to work to build Australia’s capability to safely and securely maintain its conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. As we foreshadowed at the June meeting of the Board, in late August and early September a maintenance activity was conducted on a US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. During this activity, Australian personnel participated in planned maintenance and repairs on the non-nuclear components of the submarine, marking a significant step forward in supporting Australia’s development of necessary workforce skills.
Consistent with relevant statements from the Director General, and as foreshadowed in our previous Board statement on AUKUS, Australia engaged with the IAEA to ensure that relevant technical measures were in place ahead of this activity, under Australia’s safeguards agreements with the Agency.
Chair,
The Director General has stated that he will continue to report on naval nuclear propulsion programs to the Board, as he judges appropriate. AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and welcome opportunities to address genuine questions on our program, as we did at the 2024 NPT Prep Com in Geneva, including at a well-attended side event hosted by our three countries. We will continue to provide updates at future Board meetings and in other fora, as appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.