IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 7: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
21 November 2024
Statement by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Chair
Australia extends its thanks once more to the Agency for its crucial work in Iran, and to Director General Grossi for his continued reporting on developments regarding Iran’s nuclear program. We highly appreciate the impartiality, dedication and professionalism of the Director General and the Agency’s team of inspectors in Iran.
Australia continues to support the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It is now approaching four years since Iran ceased, in February 2021, to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. Since then, the IAEA has been unable to perform verification and monitoring activities under the JCPOA. As a result, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate – which as the Agency confirms, it will not be able to restore.
We call on Iran urgently to resume application of the transparency measures which it stopped applying in 2021, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, and to cooperate with the Agency on the re-installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment and on access to verification and monitoring data. We also urge Iran to fully reverse its decision in September 2023 to withdraw the designations of experienced inspectors.
Chair
Iran has continued its sustained pattern of escalation of its nuclear program. It is expanding its enrichment capacity by installing new advanced centrifuges. Its stockpile of enriched uranium has continued to grow in this reporting period, and is now far beyond JCPOA limits. Iran’s ongoing production and stockpiling of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 is particularly concerning. This has no credible civilian justification, and sends a concerning signal regarding possible intent. We note the consultations referred to in the report on this issue and call for Iran’s prompt and full cooperation with the Agency in this regard.
Chair
Australia remains seriously concerned by Iran’s actions, which continue to undermine the Agency’s ability to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
We fully support the Director General’s efforts to preserve the Agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities. We commend his work to establish a constructive dialogue with Iran, including his visit to Tehran last week. It is essential that Iran respond promptly and in good faith by changing course and implementing without delay and in full the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023.
We request that the Director General continue to report further developments on these matters to the Board and ask that GOV/2024/61 be made public.
Thank you, Chair.