IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 12: Any other business: AUKUS Trilateral Statement
7 March 2025
Trilateral statement by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States
Thank you, Chair.
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to provide an update to the Board of Governors on Australia’s acquisition, from the early 2030s, of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
Colleagues will recall that in November last year, the Director General reported to the Board on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program. In his report, the Director General outlined the topics being discussed in bilateral discussions between Australia and the IAEA on a safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program. These consultations remain ongoing, and include:
- negotiations between Australia and the IAEA on the structure and content of an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
- provisions for advance notification, reporting and verification prior to the entry of nuclear material into an Article 14 arrangement, and the circumstances under which an arrangement would apply;
- engagement on ways to facilitate possible verification and monitoring activities, including voluntary transparency measures, in relation to Australia’s program; and
- discussions regarding the structure of material balance areas, facilities and sites at relevant locations in Australia, within the framework of Australia’s CSA and Additional Protocol.
AUKUS partners remain fully committed to ensuring that the safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program sets the highest non-proliferation standard. Under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material, and will be enabled to fulfil its technical objectives for Australia at all times: verifying there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. We support the Director General’s clear commitment that, once Australia’s Article 14 arrangement is developed, it will be referred to this Board for appropriate action.
Chair,
AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and welcome opportunities to address genuine questions on Australia’s program. To that end, we welcomed the substantial discussion on the Director General’s report on Australia’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion program at the November Board. It was regrettable that one member state disassociated from the Director General’s agenda item and insisted on a parallel item.
We will continue to keep the Board updated on relevant developments concerning our three countries’ cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion. AUKUS partners continue to build Australia’s capability to safely and securely operate and maintain its future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, consistent with the phased approach we announced in March 2023. Initiatives to uplift Australia’s capability and workforce skills are ongoing, including through more regular port visits by American and British nuclear-powered submarines to HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. We remain closely engaged with the IAEA Secretariat on all relevant developments in Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program. The Agency continues to conduct independent verification activities in relation to Australia’s program, within the framework of Australia’s CSA and Additional Protocol.
AUKUS partners continue to ensure the Agency has notice of programmatic updates when relevant. A new example is the publication on 5 March of Australia’s AUKUS Submarine Industry Strategy.
In September 2024, we informed the Board that our governments had signed the trilateral, treaty-level AUKUS Naval Nuclear Propulsion Agreement. Following completion of our respective domestic requirements, the Agreement entered into force on 17 January 2025. The Agreement enables the continued exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information between AUKUS partners, and will enable the future transfer of nuclear material and equipment from the US and the UK to Australia for use in conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
As we have previously stated, the Agreement reaffirms AUKUS partners’ commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard and confirms the key principles underlying our strong non-proliferation approach. It reaffirms, and is consistent with, AUKUS partners’ existing international non-proliferation obligations, including Australia’s obligations under the NPT, its CSA and AP with the IAEA, and under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. We reiterate that under the Agreement, the United Kingdom and the United States cannot transfer any nuclear material to Australia for use in conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines prior to Australia having an Article 14 arrangement in place with the IAEA. The assertions we have previously heard in this Board, suggesting that the trilateral AUKUS Agreement somehow circumvents Australia’s safeguards agreements with the Agency or the future Article 14 arrangement, are false.
Chair,
We fully support the Director General’s ongoing commitment to report to the Board on naval nuclear propulsion programs, as he judges appropriate. It is his prerogative to determine the appropriate timing for this matter to be placed on the Board’s agenda. We will continue to provide updates at future Board meetings and in other fora, as appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.