IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
4 June 2024
Statement by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Chair
Australia continues to support the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We extend our continued appreciation to the Agency for its professionalism, impartiality and dedication in respect to its crucial work in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
We note with concern that there has been no further progress by Iran in implementing the commitments it made in the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023. We commend the efforts by the Secretariat to work towards reviving the Joint Statement, including the Director General’s recent visit to Iran and the concrete proposals made by the Agency.
Chair
We remain deeply concerned by the removal of all JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment. The Agency has been unable to perform verification and monitoring activities under the JCPOA for more than three years due to Iran’s decision in 2021 to cease implementation of its commitments. We call on Iran to return to compliance with its nuclear-related commitments, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, and to cooperate with the Agency on the re-installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment and on access to verification and monitoring data.
The IAEA’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program is seriously undermined by Iran’s continuing lack of transparency, which has resulted in loss of continuity of knowledge with respect to Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.
Chair
We continue to be deeply concerned by the growth of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium, including the steady growth in its stockpile of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 60 per cent U-235. Iran’s ongoing production of uranium enriched to this level has no credible civilian justification. This continues to send a concerning signal regarding possible intent and comes after a pattern of sustained and disturbing escalations in Iran’s nuclear program. We also note with concern Iran’s ongoing works to further expand its enrichment capabilities.
Chair
We regret the fact that Iran has yet to reverse its decision in September last year to withdraw the designation of several experienced IAEA inspectors. This decision continues to directly and seriously affect the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities effectively.
Chair
Australia fully supports the Director General’s efforts to preserve the Agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities. We call on Iran to cease its escalatory actions and to implement without delay and in full the 4 March Joint Statement. We request that the Director General continue to report further developments on these matters to the Board and ask that GOV/2024/26 be made public.