IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 7: Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT
11 June 2026
Statement delivered by the United Kingdom on behalf of AUKUS partners
Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States to respond to false narratives about Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership. Once again, we have heard purposeful mischaracterisations of a legal and legitimate use of nuclear power, foreseen by the drafters of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and taking place within the safeguards framework.
I reiterate that Australia’s cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom on this matter is being undertaken in full compliance with our respective international obligations under the NPT, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and its protocols, and Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
The repeated attempts by China to add the current item to this meeting’s agenda imply an active compliance problem where none exists. It makes plain its intent to manipulate the Board’s agenda solely for political purposes. To be clear, this unnecessary item has not been adopted as a standing agenda item by this Board – and it has never enjoyed consensus support.
Recognising the many other pressing concerns requiring the Board’s attention, it is disappointing that valuable time continues to be taken up by this agenda item – an item that shows a fundamental lack of respect for the Director General’s exercise of his independent, technical mandate in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion programme. We continue to question the utility of this politically motivated agenda item.
Chair,
Under this item, the Board has repeatedly heard unfounded allegations that ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith. It should concern us all that we have heard assertions that disregard the statements made by the IAEA Director General, including his most recent report on Australia’s acquisition of naval nuclear propulsion published last November. As you will recall, the report indicated that Australia has continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements.
In response to some of the points we have heard today, I would also like to remind the Board that:
- The IAEA has clear authority under its Statute to negotiate directly and in confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. Attempted interference should be a cause of concern to the entire Board. It would politicise and undermine the IAEA’s independence, mandate and technical authority and establish a deeply harmful precedent.
- Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. So, it is of course not a stone thrown at the NPT regime. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement – on which Australia’s safeguards agreements is based – is the specific provision acknowledging CSA States’ ability to use nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion, within the legal framework for safeguards implementation. Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will enable the IAEA to continue meeting its technical objectives throughout the submarines’ lifecycle.
- Once Australia and the IAEA Secretariat have agreed on an Article 14 arrangement, it will be transmitted to the Board for appropriate action. The AUKUS partners fully support this approach. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed, or that the Secretariat is being pressured into reaching an Article 14 arrangement, is categorically false.
- The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine programme will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
Chair,
Our three countries continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or any deliberate attempts to undermine and politicise the technical mandate of the IAEA. Consistent with our approach to maintaining open and transparent engagement, we will provide an update to the Board under “Any Other Business” and welcome the Director General’s continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.
Should any delegations need further details on our approach, we would direct them to our NPT Review Conference Working Paper.
Thank you, Chair.