IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 5(f): Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran
10 June 2026
Statement delivered Canada on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ)
Chair,
I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of CANZ: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Our delegations thank the Director General for his report as well as Deputy DG Aparo for last week’s technical briefing. We reiterate our full support for the Agency’s impartial, fact-based, and indispensable safeguards verification role in Iran.
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand reinforce our collective support for a diplomatic solution to the long-standing and serious non-proliferation, as well as regional and international security concerns posed by Iran’s nuclear program. Iran cannot be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We firmly believe that a diplomatic agreement, supported by robust IAEA verification, is essential to achieving this objective and welcome ongoing diplomatic efforts in this regard.
At the same time, we must not ignore the deeply alarming assessments in the DG’s latest report. The report describes the Agency’s inability to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement due to Iran’s repeated failure to cooperate. We reiterate the DG’s call that it is “indispensable and urgent” for Iran to effectively implement its NPT Safeguards Agreement. These legal obligations remain in force. Their implementation cannot be suspended by Iran under any circumstances.
Chair,
In recent months, Iran has not provided the Agency with access to or information about nuclear material at several declared nuclear facilities unaffected by military strikes. This compounds serious concerns arising from the lack of verification at facilities affected by military strikes and Iran’s failure to provide the Agency with required reporting regarding nuclear material at those locations. This includes Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, measuring more than 10 IAEA significant quantities, as well as a new enrichment facility at Isfahan, the precise location and status of which remains unknown.
The impact of Iran’s complete lack of safeguards cooperation is stark: the Agency cannot verify whether Iran has suspended uranium enrichment and reprocessing and cannot verify the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile which, as the DG notes, remains a matter of proliferation concern and safeguards compliance. Iran’s failure to abide by its obligations under Modified Code 3.1 as well as its lack of implementation of the Additional Protocol as required under reinstated UNSC Resolutions leave the Agency with outstanding concerns regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Last June, this Board found Iran to be in non-compliance with its NPT obligations due to its ongoing failure to cooperate with the Agency to resolve outstanding safeguards issues as outlined in the DG’s May 2025 Comprehensive Report. Since that finding, Iran has not only failed to engage with the Agency to address these outstanding issues but its non-compliance has further expanded in scope. This raises significant non-proliferation questions, striking at the heart of the credibility of the safeguards and broader non-proliferation system, and should be a concern to all Board Members.
Chair,
Regarding the facilities affected by military strikes, our delegations recognize that the situation requires constructive cooperation between Iran and the Agency. We commend the efforts undertaken by the DG to engage with Iran in this context. Iran’s response of limiting cooperation is contrary to its legal obligations and totally unacceptable. In relation to facilities affected by armed conflict, it is essential to maintain cooperation and transparency with the Agency to ensure continued compliance with the highest safeguards standards. Iran should follow this path.
While reiterating our support for a diplomatic solution to this crisis, we echo the DG’s call on Iran to engage constructively with the Agency to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards. This cooperation must be resumed without further delay or preconditions and Iran must allow the Agency to re-establish continuity of knowledge over nuclear material at all facilities, including those affected by military activities. In this regard, we express our full support for the resolution introduced by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States under this agenda item which reinforces the Agency’s indispensable verification role and calls on Iran to resume full implementation of its safeguards obligations. We urge all Board Members to support this important resolution.
In closing, our delegations welcome continued reporting from the Director General and look forward to further updates regarding the status of Agency verification activities in Iran. We also request that his latest report be made public.
Thank you.