IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 6(d): Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran
9 September 2026
Statement delivered Canada on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ)
Chair
I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of Canada, New Zealand and my own country, Australia. Our delegations thank the Director General for his latest report on this agenda item, as well as DDG Aparo for last week’s technical briefing.
The situation outlined by the report remains alarming. During this reporting period, Iran’s lack of cooperation with the Agency on safeguards implementation has been absolute. The Agency has not been able to access any of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, leaving it unable to verify their safeguards status. Iran is failing to fulfil its most basic obligations under its safeguards agreement – which remain in force and cannot be suspended.
Iran has repeatedly failed to allow planned verification activities notified by the Agency at facilities unaffected by military strikes. In relation to the facilities affected by military strikes, our countries recognise that the situation requires constructive cooperation between Iran and the Agency. Despite the Director General’s efforts to engage, Iran has continued to fail to provide required reporting and to allow inspections at these facilities. As a result, for over a year, the Agency has been unable to verify Iran’s previously declared inventory of nuclear material at these facilities, including Iran’s large stockpile of HEU. Particularly concerning is Iran's continued refusal to provide access to the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant. More than a year after its declaration, the Agency remains unable to verify the facility's safeguards status or determine whether nuclear material is present there.
Due to its lack of access, the Agency cannot verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, or the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Iran also continues to fail to implement the Additional Protocol, as required under reinstated Security Council resolutions, and to fulfil its legal obligations under Modified Code 3.1. And it refuses to cooperate with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues outlined in the DG’s May 2025 Comprehensive Report. The Agency remains unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in Iran. This is an extraordinary safeguards situation for any State Party to the NPT and cannot become a new normal. Immediate action is required.
Chair
Iran’s serious non-compliance with its obligations continues to undermine the integrity of the safeguards regime and to raise grave non-proliferation concerns. Over the past year, the Board has repeatedly called on Iran to provide the information and access required for effective safeguards implementation. Iran has not done so. In those circumstances, further Board action is warranted. Therefore, our countries support the resolution which has been tabled by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to report this matter to the Security Council, and urge all Board members to vote in favour.
The Director General has underlined that the Agency is fully prepared to resume its safeguards activities in Iran at short notice. Confidence cannot be rebuilt without verification, and verification cannot resume without Iran's cooperation. The Agency stands ready to do its job. Iran must now allow it to do so.
Our countries again reiterate our collective support for a diplomatic solution to the longstanding regional and international concerns posed by Iran’s nuclear program and for the Agency’s indispensable safeguards and verification role in Iran. We request that the Director General’s latest report be made public.
Thank you.