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IAEA Board of Governors: Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

Agenda item 3(c): Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia

18 November 2026

Statement delivered by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA, on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Chair,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

We thank the Director General for his latest report on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, following his four previous reports since September 2022. We fully support the Director General’s commitment to report to this Board on such programs and to place them on the agenda, as he judges appropriate. 

As outlined in the report, Australia and the IAEA continue detailed technical discussions on the development of a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program, including an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Topics under discussion include

  • the structure and content of an Article 14 arrangement;
  • technical aspects and modalities to facilitate possible IAEA verification and monitoring activities at locations in Australia supporting Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program; and
  • the implementation of safeguards by design.

Among other developments, as stated in the report, technical agreement was reached on the reporting structure for the material balance area, facility and site for one location involved in the program.

AUKUS partners reiterate our commitment to ensuring the safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program sets the highest non-proliferation standard. To be clear, this does not mean imposing a ‘one size fits all’ model for verifying naval nuclear propulsion. Given the technical differences between individual programs, such a model would not be effective. Rather, it means enabling the IAEA to continue to meet its technical objectives at all stages of the lifecycle of Australia’s future submarines. In other words, we are committed to ensuring that under Australia’s Article 14 Arrangement, the IAEA will continue to be able to confirm there has been: no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.

The report again confirms that, once the Article 14 Arrangement is finalised, the Director General will transmit it to the Board of Governors for appropriate action. AUKUS partners fully support this approach.

Chair,

As indicated by the Director General in his report, Australia continues to fulfil its reporting requirements under its CSA, Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangements. The IAEA is conducting verification activities in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements. These activities have included complementary access and the collection of environmental samples at relevant locations.

Since AUKUS was first announced in 2021, we have provided updates to every Board meeting on developments regarding Australia’s acquisition, from the early 2030s, of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

AUKUS partners are committed to setting the highest non-proliferation standard for Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. This commitment is reflected in some of the earliest choices in the design of the program, which have been made to strengthen its non-proliferation credentials.

For example, Australia has committed to not enriching uranium, producing nuclear fuel, or reprocessing spent fuel for its submarine program. Nuclear material supplied by the United Kingdom and United States will be contained in complete, welded power units that will not require refuelling during their lifetime. This removes the need to routinely access the fuel element, reduces the amount of spent fuel produced and avoids the need to maintain a stockpile of fresh fuel.

Since AUKUS partners’ update to the Board in September 2026, we have continued to work closely to develop the workforce, expertise and capabilities required for Australia to safely and securely operate, maintain and steward its future submarine fleet. Australian military and civilian personnel continue to be embedded with the UK Royal Navy, the US Navy, and with UK and US industry. Since the Director General’s 2025 report, Australian personnel have continued to take on more responsibility for coordinating and delivering maintenance works in support of US and UK submarine maintenance activities at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. As we informed the Board earlier this year, a UK Submarine Maintenance Period (SMP) took place at Stirling in February and March 2026. This marked the first time a UK nuclear-powered submarine has undertaken a maintenance period in Australia. On October 27, the USS Colorado arrived at HMAS Stirling for the fourth SMP in Western Australia. SMP activities continue to be carried out in a manner fully consistent with AUKUS partners’ respective non-proliferation and safeguards obligations, in line with our commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard.

These activities represent significant milestones in preparation for Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) at HMAS Stirling, with USS Colorado assigned as its first submarine from late 2027. The planned rotational presence will comprise up to four US submarines and one UK submarine.

As we have previously advised the Board, this initiative, Submarine Rotational Force-West, builds on previous visits to HMAS Stirling over decades and will further strengthen Australia's capacity to safely own, operate, and sustain its future submarines. All activities continue to be carried out in a manner fully consistent with AUKUS partners’ respective international obligations, including under the NPT, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and its protocols, and Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Work also continues on the design and construction of the future Nuclear-Powered Submarine Construction Yard at Osborne in South Australia, and on planning for the Henderson Defence Precinct at Western Australia. Australia has kept the IAEA informed of all relevant developments.

Australia remains firmly committed to ensuring that its naval nuclear propulsion enterprise is underpinned by the highest standards of nuclear safety. Established last year, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator continues to oversee a robust regulatory framework informed by more than seven decades of safe naval nuclear propulsion experience in the United States and the United Kingdom, adapted to Australia's unique operating context.

Chair

We continue to welcome Board discussion of naval nuclear propulsion programs under this agenda item.

We again thank the Director General and his team for his report – GOV/INF/2026/15 – and in the interest of openness and transparency, we request that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.