IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 6(c): NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran
10 September 2025
Statement by H.E. Alison Grant, Governor and Resident Representative of Canada to the IAEA on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ)
Chair,
I am pleased to deliver this statement on behalf of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (CANZ). Our delegations thank the Director General for his latest report on this agenda item as well as DDG Aparo for last week’s technical briefing.
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand reaffirm our full and long-standing support for the IAEA’s safeguards verification role as an essential component for the effective implementation of the NPT. We deeply appreciate the Agency’s technical and evidence-based implementation of safeguards activities in Iran and firmly reject any attempts to call into question the Agency’s impartiality and professionalism. We also reject threats against the personal safety of Agency personnel, including the Director General, which are entirely unacceptable.
Our delegations are deeply concerned that the Agency has not been able to conduct safeguards verification activities in Iran for two and half months and that there are currently no Agency inspectors physically present in Iran. Iran’s legal safeguards obligations under the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement remain unchanged.
We note with serious concern the DG’s conclusion that, without the resumption of the full implementation of safeguards in Iran, the Agency will not be able to provide any conclusions or assurances regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. It is alarming that there is currently no verification of Iran’s significant stockpile of highly enriched uranium for which there is no credible civilian justification. This lack of verification raises grave risks about potential diversion of Iran’s HEU.
Unfortunately, these challenges are not new. We underline that the international community has long held serious concerns related to Iran’s non-compliance and non-cooperation. This Board’s resolution this past June found that Iran’s many failures to uphold its legal obligations constitute non-compliance with its CSA. This resolution was based on the assessments of the DG’s Comprehensive Report from 31 May which identified several unresolved safeguards issues, including Iran’s failure to declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at undeclared locations, the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material, and limited cooperation from Iran.
Iran has repeatedly failed to fully implement concrete steps to address its longstanding non-compliance. Until this is fully corrected and Iran’s cooperation with the Agency is fully restored, Iran’s compliance with its legal safeguards obligations under the NPT and the CSA will be in question.
Chair,
Iran’s failure to cooperate with the Agency with respect to safeguards implementation presents a threat to the global non-proliferation regime as well as regional and international security and should be a matter of grave concern to all Board members. In this context, we welcome the dedicated personal efforts of Director General Grossi in engaging with Iran, including identifying technical modalities to facilitate the resumption of Agency verification in Iran.
While we take note of the Agreement reached between the DG and Iran yesterday in Cairo, it is essential that Iran take immediate and concrete steps to implement these technical modalities and allow Agency inspectors to resume verification activities in Iran. Such modalities must include cooperation with the Agency to assess facilities damaged by military strikes and technical steps to allow the Agency to verify Iran’s HEU stockpile. We urge Iran to resume practical cooperation with the Agency without further delay.
In closing, our delegations welcome continued reporting from the Director General on this issue and look forward to further updates regarding the status of Agency verification activities in Iran. We also request that his latest report be made public.
Thank you.