IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
9 September 2025
Statement by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Governor and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Chair
Australia continues to support the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Unfortunately, since 2019 – a period of more than six years – Iran progressively and deliberately ceased performing its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA.
Iran expanded its enrichment capacity, installing and operating large numbers of advanced centrifuge cascades. Its stockpile of enriched uranium grew to greatly exceed the limits established by the JCPOA. Furthermore, Iran produced and accumulated a growing stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% - with no credible civilian justification.
Exacerbating doubts about its intentions, Iran ceased to provide the transparency required under the JCPOA – including, inter alia, application of the Additional Protocol. The Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.
The Director General’s latest report confirms that the Agency has now also lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including Iran’s high enriched uranium. Agency verification of Iran’s HEU is now significantly overdue, raising grave concerns about potential diversion.
As the Director General’s report stresses, this issue must be addressed urgently. Iran needs to resume cooperation with the Agency and permit it to recommence in-field verification and monitoring activities, in full compliance with its international obligations. Australia welcomes the Director General’s announcement this morning of agreement with Iran on practical steps to resume full verification in accordance with the CSA, and looks forward to immediate implementation.
Chair
Australia supported the decision by the E3, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, to trigger the ‘snapback’ mechanism, in light of Iran’s significant and prolonged non-performance of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Despite the exhaustive good faith efforts undertaken by the E3 to resolve Iran’s non-compliance through the relevant JCPOA processes, Iran had not taken the necessary steps to address the international community’s most pressing concerns with its nuclear program or return to compliance.
We continue to support diplomacy and dialogue to address serious international concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. It is essential that Iran engage urgently and in good faith to reach an acceptable diplomatic solution – one which provides assurance that Iran can never develop a nuclear weapon.
Chair
We again thank the Director General and his team for the Agency’s independent, objective reporting under this agenda item, and their ongoing work to monitor developments at Iran’s nuclear facilities. We request that the Director General’s report be made public, and that he continue to report relevant developments to the Board.
Thank you, Chair.