IAEA Board of Governors Meeting
Statement by H. E. Mr Richard Sadleir, Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Agenda Item 3: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
24-26 November 2021
Thank you Chair
Australia continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its non-proliferation objectives. We welcome the announcement that talks on a return to the JCPOA will resume in Vienna on 29 November.
We are hopeful that those talks will lead to concrete progress. But we are increasingly concerned that the space for optimism is shrinking at an alarming pace.
Chair
Australia is a strong and longstanding supporter of the critical work undertaken by the Director General and his staff at the IAEA. We have full confidence in the Agency’s rigorous, independent and professional approach to verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In this vein, Australia fully supports the Director General’s determined efforts to preserve and maintain the agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities and his efforts to retrieve critical safeguards data in Iran.
Chair
While this engagement is welcome, it must be backed up by full and faithful implementation by Iran. The refusal by Iran to allow IAEA inspectors access to the Karaj workshop, pursuant to its 12 September Joint Statement with the Agency, is unacceptable. Iran cannot and must not unilaterally reinterpret agreements entered into with the Agency, or other parties, if there is to be a satisfactory resolution to this situation.
Chair
Australia is increasingly concerned by Iran’s growing stockpile of enriched uranium, which is an order of magnitude greater than the limit imposed under the JCPOA. We are particularly concerned at the previously reported production of uranium metal and the growth of highly enriched uranium in the stockpile, including the estimated 17.7kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235.
Australia is equally concerned at Iran’s production of uranium metal enriched to 20 per cent U-235 and the irreversible research and development capabilities gained from the production and operation of centrifuges, which are not permitted under the JCPOA, and for which there are no credible civilian uses.
We reiterate our urgent call on Iran to reverse all of its steps away from the JCPOA and to recommit itself to the terms of the agreement.
We further urge Iran to return promptly to full implementation of the Additional Protocol and other JCPOA transparency commitments.
We request that the Director General continues to report further developments on these matters and ask that GOV/2021/51 be made public.
Thank you Chair